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Piketty’s major contribution is empirical documentation of the long-term trend of 
the capitalist system toward greater inequality, a trend only reversed in periods after 
world wars (Piketty 2014).1 The “the central contradiction of capitalism” (571), according 
to Piketty, is increasing inequality which is expressed in the formula r>g. This means that 
“the rate of return on capital remains significantly above the growth rate for an extended 
period of time… [such that] wealth accumulated in the past grows more rapidly than 
output and wages” (25, 571). We may recall that Marx described the rule of the past over 
the present in this way: “capital is dead labour which, vampire-like, lives only by sucking 
living labour, and lives the more, the more labour it sucks” (Marx 1977, 342). Piketty 
shows that, in general, it is only when growth is high that the tendency to inequality is 
muted or reversed. Given that the widely accepted prognosis, perhaps excepting currently 
underdeveloped Third World economies, is for low levels of economic growth (25, 572), 
the expectation that Piketty’s analysis provokes is for increasing inequality for the 
foreseeable future.  
The most significant periods of growth in the 20th century occurred as a result of 
world wars (15, 471, 572). A main factor is of course the destruction that opened up post-
war economic growth, but political factors also are significant. While Piketty recognizes 
political factors (481, 577), his approach does not allow him to explain or describe them 
deeply.2  Regarding the social compromise that produced the “social state,”3 as he calls                                                         
1 Quotations from, and references to, this text will henceforth be registered in the main text with a page 
number only. 
2 Marjorie Griffin-Cohen has documented the correlation between war and rising income of the working 
class based on Piketty’s data and argued convincingly that Piketty’s analysis undervalues the role of political 
factors in such a conjuncture (Griffin-Cohen 2014). 
3 Piketty uses the term “social state” to refer to what is usually called in English the “welfare state.” The 
latter term contains the problem that it may be seen as the production of welfare for poor recipients rather 
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it—or, as we usually say, the “welfare state,”—after World War II, we should mention that 
the expectations of returning soldiers and the imperative of the ruling class to truncate 
social mobilization based on these expectations, combined with the recent memory of the 
Depression, opened political opportunities for the working class in a period of economic 
growth due to wartime destruction. After the Second World War in particular, the 
welfare state compromise between workers through their representatives in unions and 
labour parties, large corporations, and governments led to a period of long-term growth 
in which real incomes of the working class rose creating a citizen identity that largely 
overshadowed class consciousness (Angus 1997, 20-27, 40-46; 2008, 50-62).  
The general tendency of capital to increase inequality is not only countered by 
periods of high growth and political action leading to state redistribution, which are what 
we might call external factors to economic forces. The key internal factors that tend to 
decrease inequality are “the diffusion of knowledge and investment in training and skills” 
(21, see also 71, 571). The increase in what is sometimes called “human capital” signifies 
labour power as modified by skills, training, and ability (46) that Marx believed could be 
theoretically reduced to a multiplication of unmodified average human labour (Marx 
1997, 135). Again, Piketty does not provide much political analysis of this point, but it is 
not too difficult to see that if the skills required in a technologically advanced production 
system are widely distributed and mobilized by workers, then their bargaining power over 
wages is strengthened and, thereby, inequality is decreased. Nevertheless, one must 
emphasize that this is one tendency among others and that, as Piketty says, “even with the 
considerable increase in the average level of education over the course of the twentieth 
century, earned income inequality did not decrease” (484). Moreover, there is no 
evidence that education has increased intergenerational social mobility (420). 
These political additions—friendly amendments, we might call them—to Piketty’s 
analysis pertain to one of its central hypotheses. According to Piketty, meritocracy is the 
main legitimation of capitalism to the general population (26, 419-22). We can see that 
increasing inequality only poses a contradiction for capitalism, apart from outright 
immiseration, because the system garners loyalty by promising economic prosperity for 
all successful enterprising individuals and, we should add, interpreting failure to do so as 
an individual failure of ability or effort. Inequality due to inherited wealth contradicts 
legitimation by meritocracy. We should note, as Piketty does not, that meritocracy is by 
definition an individualist response to economic inequality and is thereby compatible 
with widespread inequality and deprivation. However, it is not too much to say that 
meritocracy, or class mobility, was a central part of the welfare state compromise, which                                                                                                                                                                      
than a system of universal social programs funded by high taxes. The Spanish “estado de bien estar” or 
“state of well-being” captures this sense better even than “social state.” It is important to insist on this point 
since it was the reinterpretation of universal programs as remedial ones for the poor that enabled the Right 
to begin dismantling the welfare state. 
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included a universal social safety net and job protection for the working class, as well as 
an acceptance of capitalist enterprise.4 To this extent, the increasing inequality that 
Piketty documents is not only an economic problem for post-welfare state societies, but 
also a problem of political legitimation. 
Education in the widest sense is thus, in Piketty’s analysis, the basis of the main 
internal tendency toward decrease in inequality, even though this countervailing 
tendency has in general not prevailed over the structural tendency of capital to increase 
inequality. Moreover, widespread access to higher education regardless of social origin 
was a key aspect of the claim to individual social mobility in the social state, or welfare 
state, compromise that temporarily decreased inequality after World War II (484). 
Piketty’s proposal for the social state at a global, or at least regional, level funded by a tax 
on capital is essentially an attempt to restore that compromise in conditions of a 
neoliberal global economy. 
I want to now concentrate separately on the two aspects of the problem of 
education in capitalist society that Piketty lumps together without further analysis: 
investment in education for skills training and the social diffusion of knowledge. 
It is obvious that state spending on higher education has fallen drastically with the 
decline of the welfare state and the globalization of the economy. With the loss of the 
legitimation of higher education as the production of informed citizens, only skills 
education as defined by the labour market has had any chance of surviving. Many 
countries, such as Canada, invest at very low levels in skills training and supply skilled 
labour through privately funded education or immigration. Thus, a common social-
democratic response has often been to argue for greater investment in skilled labour and 
restriction on immigration to fill remaining absences in the workforce. This politics 
necessarily implies competition between countries at an international level: one can fund 
advanced skills training nationally only if the labour force is attracted domestically by 
appropriate jobs. In practice, this leads to international competition over advanced 
technology in which the previously advanced countries retain their advantage. In short, it 
contributes to a decrease in national inequality at the price of greater world inequality. 
Piketty’s proposal for a world tax on capital to contribute to spending on a new social 
state does not evade this problem. He accepts that a world tax is a utopia and opts for 
regional economies, such as the European Union (515-8). But the upshot of this would be 
to fund advanced skills within the EU at the price of restriction on immigration and 
competition over technological advance. 
In summary, social state funding for education at a regional level could mitigate 
inequality internally only by exporting it to the rest of the world. This is where the other 
aspect of education, which Piketty does not discuss other than to note its importance to                                                         
4 This is by no means a complete analysis. It leaves out, for example, the gender dimensions of the family 
wage (Fraser 1996) and an imperialist relation to the so-called Third World. 
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decreasing inequality comes in: diffusion of knowledge on a social scale. Piketty says, 
correctly in my view, that diffusion and sharing of knowledge is “the public good par 
excellence” (21). That is to say, it is not just education for individual social mobility 
within a meritocratic legitimation, but widespread diffusion of knowledge that might 
then assume a social purpose. How stands it with education understood in this way?  
It was often argued during the period of the welfare state that public funding of 
higher education contained a contradiction between its individual, meritocratic 
dimension and the universal social goals that education made apparent. Thus, higher 
education could make a contribution to understanding the struggle for social equality. To 
the extent that public funding has receded, this social function has receded also. If one 
pays a huge private tuition for higher education, then one can expect to be the sole, 
individual beneficiary. Moreover, skills training driven by the requirements of science 
and technology predominates over general education. The role of education in decreasing 
inequality thereby would seem to disappear altogether. So, we may well ask, is there a 
contradiction in the role of education under current conditions, or has it become just 
another brick in the wall of the increasing inequality produced by capitalism? 
In a statement in Grundrisse that has become increasingly relevant and widely 
discussed in recent years, Marx claimed that there is such a contradiction: The 
development of large industry comes to depend less on the direct labour time expended 
in production and more on what he called “the general state of science and technology” 
(Marx 1973, 705). In such a condition, labour time ceases to be the measure of value and 
thus exchange value ceases to dominate use value. This contradiction allows “the process 
of social life … [to] come under the control of the general intellect and … [be] 
transformed in accordance with it” (ibid., 706). In short, the socialization and diffusion of 
knowledge required by advanced technology tends to burst the confines of capitalist 
production. Though more cautious at this point, it seems that Piketty regards—and here I 
agree with both Marx and Piketty—the diffusion of knowledge as a force tending to 
decrease inequality and perhaps even tending to burst its capitalist bounds. 
The contradiction in contemporary education for the skills and training necessary 
for advanced technological production is this: that capitalist forces tend to confine 
education to acquisition of skills defined as necessary within the production process 
whereas such skill acquisition under conditions of advanced technology and its reliance 
on science contains a universal dimension that we could follow Marx in calling the 
“general intellect.” The dilemma of the capitalist order is to develop advanced skills 
acquisition while rejecting or minimizing the general intellect that seems to be its product 
and, thereby, becomes a widespread minimum social level of education required for the 
contemporary workforce. 
Whether capitalism can contain this contradiction is of course an empirical 
question with many dimensions. The regional social democratic strategy proposed by 
Piketty attempts to contain the contradiction within a defined frame—no longer national 
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but similarly restricted—and expel the contradiction outside to issues of immigration and 
international competition. The neoliberal strategy, which minimizes the social state and 
its support for education, tends to subordinate the acquisition of education to inherited 
wealth in the same manner as property, healthcare, sustenance, etc. By confining 
education to a traditional privilege, the neoliberal strategy avoids a contradiction in 
education and subsumes it into the more encompassing contradiction of a widening gap 
between rich and poor. There will be a treason of some intellectuals due to the universal 
dimension of scientific knowledge and inquiry, as in Marx’s day, but no contradiction 
within technological society itself. 
I would thus define the possibility of the radical alternative as expressed by Marx’s 
analysis in this way: for the possibility of an emancipation of the general intellect, the 
social aspect of the intellect must be recognized and institutionalized so that its internal 
contradiction can be effective. Piketty’s strategy, as a revised social democratic strategy, 
might be a starting point in this respect, since education would be supported and 
recognized as an element of social policy tending toward decreasing inequality whose 
contradiction of the major tendency of capital toward increasing inequality would remain 
a source of potential conflict and social advance. But even if this might be a viable 
transitional strategy, the problem goes deeper and further than a revised social 
democratic strategy can appreciate. 
To conclude, the international “No to Austerity” slogans and movements are a 
start in the right direction. They build on the history of the social rights of the citizen as 
established by the welfare state, but potentially go beyond it insofar as those rights are 
now being eroded and the major neoliberal tendency of global capital would be to 
eliminate social rights altogether. If some accommodation of education as a social right 
can be attained, the contradiction pinpointed by Marx will be given new life and can be 
expected to motivate further inventive politics aimed at establishing the social intellect as 
the governor of production. If a national or regional frame consists in exporting 
inequality, as I have argued, then the problem for a radical opposition is to find 
alternative institutional forms in which the general intellect can prosper. 
A central aspect of this new life of the social intellect is the relationship between 
ecology and growth: capitalism relies on growth, which depends upon maximizing certain 
factors of production and consumption in relative isolation from others; whereas ecology 
demands the systemic understanding of as many factors as possible. One may expect to 
see a contradiction in the social intellect between these systemic versus maximizing 
tendencies. Piketty does mention climate change (567-9) and “the development of new 
forms of property and democratic control of capital” (569) in passing, but these brief 
mentions do not enter into the central themes of his analysis or proposal. Given the 
historical relationship between growth, state funding of higher education, and the 
tendency to decreasing inequality in the diffusion of knowledge, this absence may be the 
most significant contemporary implication of increasing inequality for our ability to 
191
Socialist Studies / Études socialistes 11 (1) Winter 2016  
confront pressing problems. Piketty has nothing to say about this, but I suspect that this 
contradiction may be the aspect of higher education most crucial in the future. 
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